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DICTA

It seems quite possible that the 1933 statute, as it relates
to separate maintenance," merely sets out the judge-made law
of Colorado. But it is submitted that this is not wise or forward-looking legislation. It places in our statutory law something that might better be forgotten.
If we must have such a divorce, the law should provide
for a merger of the decree after a certain time into one of absolute divorce in case there is no reconciliation. The promotion
of reconciliation seems to be the only sensible basis for limited
divorce2 and this can just as easily be obtained under an interlocutory decree of divorce a vinculo1 3 But we do not need
such a divorce, and Colorado would be stepping forward if she
abolished it.
'The statute also provides that the courts shall have power to specifically enforce
marriage settlement and separate maintenance agreements whether the parties thereto are
divorced or not. Many husbands and wives will separate no matter what the law.
Therefore as a matter of practical policy it seems proper to give legal sanction to fair
agreements relating to support and property rights.
'But Colorado law, C. S. A. chap. 56, sec. 25 (b)-a
wife may maintain the
action if she has been abandoned "and a reconciliation is not probable."
This may well be the basis of West Virginia's action in repealing its statute allowing limited divorce (1931) . West Virginia had before that time allowed such merger.
Louisiana provides (see Vernier, supra, p. 422, and 1938 supplement p. 76)
that where there has been no reconciliation after the expiration of one year from the
obtaining of the decree of limited divorce, the successful party may apply for an absolute
divorce. The party against whom the limited divorce was obtained may apply for an
absolute divorce after one year and sixty days from the obtaining of the decree of limited
divorce. But in Louisiana a limited divorce is a necessary prelude to an absolute divorce
and is really in the nature of an interlocutory decree. Since Colorado has such: it is
submitted that there is no need here for a limited divorce, even though made just and
fair as in Louisiana.

THE COLORADO VIEW ON ALTERATION OF
TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS
By MARVIN L. BROWN and EUGENE SCHAETZEL, School of

Law, 1939, Denver University
HIS discussion will be limited to a consideration of the
legal effect of alterations made in a will after its execution
by the testator, in the absence of a re-execution in statutory manner. • For the purpose of discussion there shall be
presumed previous proof that any change was made by the
testator, himself, and not by some other person. Obviously,
there is no concern over alteration of an holographic will, but
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only over alteration of a testamentary instrument where there
has clearly been no compliance with statutory requirements.
Testamentary alterations of this nature are not such as are
intended to work a revocation of the whole instrument, but
are only those intended to work a change as to one or more
parts of the instrument, leaving the remainder as originally
executed.
Such alteration seems to give rise to four possible effects
in law: (1) the alteration might act as a total revocation of
the instrument; (2) the alteration might act as a partial revocation of so much of the instrument as is affected; (3) the
alteration might be ignored and the instrument admitted to
probate in its original form; (4) the will might be given effect
as altered. No attempt will be made here to exhaust and
explain the authorities on this subject as there is a complete
survey of the field in 62 A. L. R. 1376 and 115 A. L. R. 715.
Instead, there is given here a mere summary of the general
rules pointed out by the cases, and an attempt to determine
from them which of these rules Colorado should adopt in the
various situations.
Before it is possible to determine whether an alteration
may operate as a total or partial revocation, the possibility of
revocation pro-tanto must be determined. If revocation protanto is possible an alteration may have the effect of revoking
part of a will even though the ultimate purpose of the testator
in giving effect to the will as altered is not accomplished. The
possibility of revocation pro-tanto depends upon the particular statute of the jurisdiction. Colorado's statute concerning
the revocation of wills states: "No will shall be revoked otherwise than by," etc.,' unlike statutes commonly found elsewhere which begin "No will or any part thereof shall be revoked otherwise than by." It has been almost uniformly held
as to statutes such as that in Colorado that revocation protanto will not be permitted, since by omitting reference to
a part of the will the legislature has indicated an intent that
there can be no valid revocation of such a part.
Where the statute does impliedly authorize a revocation
pro-tanto by words included therein, it differs distinctly from
an act such as Colorado's and should have no authoritative
'1935 C. S. A., Cb. 176, Sec. 40.
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effect in the construction of our act. On the other hand, the
very fact that Colorado adopted her act in view of a majority
holding that such an act would not admit of partial revocation
would seem to preclude all arguments to the contrary. Under
either type of statute the doctrine of dependent relative revocation may apply in this situation. Under this doctrine, if
the cancellation were relative and dependent upon the efficacy
of the substituted portion, then, since the substituted portion
cannot be given effect because of the failure to comply with the
wills act, the will is reestablished as originally executed, as it
is presumed that the testator did not intend to cancel the deleted portion in any event but only upon the condition that
the substituted portion be given effect. The same result is
reached under a statute such as that in Colorado without the
application of the doctrine since it is here impossible to make
a partial revocation in any circumstances except perhaps where
the original contents are incapable of proof. Under circumstances where there is shown to be an absolute intent to revoke
a part of the will in spite of a failure of the interlined portion,
then states with the type of statute differing from that in
Colorado will disregard dependent relative revocation and
allow the revocation pro-tanto; here the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation has no application.
Interlineations may be of many different types, but of
whatever type they are generally disregarded. Where they
would operate as dispositive provisions they are everywhere
void for non-conformity with the wills act. In such cases,
the fourth possibility of solution above suggested is never
employed. Where the alterations are merely inserted to explain and clarify parts of the original will and are therefore
not intended to affect the substance of any gift, they may
either be disregarded or recognized to be without force in
probate.
Of course, there is a possibility of revocation pro-tanto
by operation of law, wherein the impelling force arises independently of the testator's act. Fraud or undue influence
upon the testator by one of the beneficiaries may operate to
revoke the will in part, but the other beneficiaries should not
be forced to suffer by this wrong so the remainder of the will
should be probated as it stands. This result will be reached
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by a court under either type of revocatory statute since the
court will prevent the fraud without regard to the testator's
ability to revoke his will. Although the statute does not
recognize this latter type of revocation pro-tanto, the court
will accomplish its end by use of other powers. Colorado
courts have worked such a partial revocation several times and
have indicated an intention to follow the above-stated rule.2
Now, with the benefit of the foregoing analysis of possibilities of revocation pro-tanto, let us undertake the task of
determining how Colorado's courts would rule upon the different propositions previously set forth:
(1) Although Colorado cases on all points akin to the
revocation of wills are meager, we may assume that an attempted partial revocation will not work to void the will
completely unless the revoked portion is such a material part
of the will as to imply an intent to revoke the whole. The
early case of Glass v. Scott, 14 Colo. App. 377, 60 P. 186
(1900), recognized that the mere drawing of a line through
the testator's signature would revoke the will. In like manner any cancellation of other material parts of a will should
operate similarly if it showed a revocation by obliteration
combined with an intention to revoke the whole. Where cancelling and interlining is carried to such an extent as to amount
to a complete revision of the will, then it would seem that the
testator has intended that his original will should be revoked
in original form and the court, recognizing this obvious intent,
should declare the will void as an obliteration within the
statute. Partial cancellation should have no similar effect
even though the full intent of the testator cannot be carried
out, since the leaving of the major portions of the will untouched indicates that the testator wanted the original will
to stand in force.
(2) Partial revocation will be effected by operation of
law to prevent fraud, but it cannot be accomplished by the
voluntary act of the testator except by impossibility of proof
of the original context. Practically, it is possible that the
testator could so completely obliterate a small portion of his
'Snodgrass v. Smith, 42 Colo. 60, 94 P. 312; Ireland v. Hudson, 92 Colo. 110,
18 P. (2d) 311: Frazier v. Frazier, 83 Colo. 188, 263 P. 413: Jeffreys v. Trust Co.,
97 Colo. 188, 48 P. (2d) 1019.
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will as by erasure or cutting that it would be impossible to
determine the content of the deleted portions. Under such
circumstances we might expect the court to be very strict in
determining whether or not an intention was indicated to
revoke the whole by cancellation of a material portion. However, if it is determined that the portion is not essential there
is no reason why the instrument should not be accepted for
probate with allowance that the deleted portion might be later
inserted by acceptable proof of its contents if this proves possible. It is immaterial here that there be interlineations in
conjunction with the attempted partial revocation, since they
cannot be of force and the partial revocations will not be recognized if susceptible of proof. If the context of the partial
revocation is not susceptible of proof, then the will should
simply be admitted to probate with any interlineations omitted and with the deleted portions blank. The note in 62
A. L. R. above quoted on page 114, collects the authorities
supporting this view. Hence in this single situation there is
a possibility of revocation pro-tanto in Colorado arising
through inability to prove the contents of the deleted portion.
This is the most desirable result though apparently not authorized by statute.
As a result then, partial revocation in Colorado will fail
to take effect and the will can be probated in the form in which
originally executed, or with blanks. This seems to be a very
logical result in view of Colorado's narrow statute, since it
will prevent the imposition of frauds upon the court. If partial revocation were allowed in spite of the seeming statutory
intent as it exists, we might expect evildoers oftentimes to
attempt to change the will between the time of finding and
the time of delivery to the court.
(3) We have seen above that partial cancellation and
attempted change will not act either completely or partially
to void the will except in the one situation of inability to
prove the contents of the deleted portion. Logically, therefore, we come upon the rule which should be applied in ordinary circumstances. The will, not intended to be completely
revoked and not capable of being probated as partially revoked where the contents can be proved, should be probated
as originally executed disregarding all attempted cancellations
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and interlineations. Apparently, most will changes are of
the nature wherein there is a partial cancellation combined
with an interlineation, but as yet the Supreme Court of Colorado has never been called upon to rule as to the effect of this.
It has been stated by our court that revocation cannot be
effected (by the testator's act) except in the manner provided
for in the statute.' A recent case in the trial court completely
sustains the view here taken.'
(4) The previous discussion is sufficient to show that
there is no support for a view that Colorado would give effect
to the will as altered except in the situation where the alteration
consists solely of an obliteration and it is impossible to prove
the contents of the obliterated portion. In that situation the
will should be admitted to probate with the obliterated portions blank, and hence the will is given effect as altered. In
all other situations this could not be accomplished.
'Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444 at 462, 211 P. 668.
'In re Jones, Estate No. 60817, County Court of City and County of Denver.

THE TAXPAYER'S DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
By Lois GESSFORD CLARK, School of Law, 1939,
Denver University
HE taxpayer, now deceased, who hailed the case of The
Loan and Trust Company, Executors v. Minnesota' of 1930, the cases following it, and the Federal Interpleader Act' of 1936, as the solution to the oppressive burden of paying two state inheritance taxes on his
intangibles, is stirring uneasily in his grave; and the taxpayer
who has survived the tax burden thus far, is shaking perceptibly in his shoes, and is wondering just what the Supreme
Court of the United States did mean in The Farmers Loan and
Trust Company case when it said, "We have determined that
in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile
of their owner, and we can find no sufficient reason for saying
that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against tax-

TFarmers

'280 U. S. 204.
'28 U. S. C. A., para. 41 (26).

